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COVID-19 has left many governments facing questions of priority for which there is no 
obvious conceptual framework. When questions of politics, economics and health are so 
intertwined that one cannot be properly discussed without the others then neither political 
economy nor public health offer an adequate basis. Here I draw on principles of 
measurement to distil from epidemiology and economics the foundational concepts 
required in the current circumstances for governing. For governments determined to 
control their epidemic, I conclude they cannot avoid subordinating all other principles to a 
threshold of unhealthiness, and that these thresholds can be ordered. A corollary is a new 
and enduring uncertainty in all questions of policy. I illustrate different thresholds with 
examples from the United Kingdom, Hong Kong and New Zealand. 
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In their influential analysis of options for governments facing COVID-19, the Imperial College 
public health team outlined a strategy of suppression (Ferguson et al., 2020). Suppression 
“aims to reverse epidemic growth, reducing case numbers to low levels and maintaining 
that situation indefinitely.” It thus combines a response to an incipient epidemic with a 
prescription for its ongoing management, a conflation which from a purely analytical 
perspective is unhelpful. 
 
Focussing solely on the first aspect and remembering the context in the UK when Ferguson 
et al were writing, we can define the concept of domination. A country is capable of 
dominating its epidemic if it can reverse epidemic growth, reducing case numbers to low 
levels even when: i) the disease has become so widespread that its locality cannot be 
defined; ii) tracking and tracing individual cases has become impractical; and iii) the 
proportion of the population with immunity is very small. That is, even from a very 
challenging starting point the reproduction number, Rt, has to be pushed below 1 and kept 
there for a sustained period of weeks or months.  
 
The concept of domination is helpful because it defines the minimum capacity that a state 
requires in order to be sure of being able to take control of its epidemic. Many countries 
have now demonstrated it but it is not necessarily permanent. Exhaustion – of economic 
resources, of a public willing to comply with intrusive control measures (currently limited to 
non-pharmaceutical forms of intervention, NPIs) or of political will – may lead to its 
collapse. There are fears that many poor countries lack this capacity from the outset 
(Goldin, 2020). 
 
Domination marks a fundamental shift in the character of an epidemic. It has been tamed 
and ceases to be a natural phenomenon like the weather that we must simply endure. The 
natural force itself becomes a problem to be managed. The need for management continues 
until some reasonable degree of herd immunity is achieved so that outbreaks become self-
limiting. Most likely this means waiting for either a vaccine or a sufficient number of people 
to become infected, acquire immunity and retain it.  
 
In the current circumstances, the need for management could last for many years. If we 
assume a basic reproduction number, R0, of 3, the mid-point of the range recently allowed 
for in the European context by Flaxman et al, then herd immunity arises when two thirds of 
the population have acquired immunity. In the UK, as at 28 March, just 2.7 per cent of the 
UK population had been infected (Flaxman et al., 2020). 
 
The characteristics of the virus itself, the physical and social environment in which it is 
transmitted, the resources of the state and the quality of technology available all make a 
material difference to the challenge facing the government. Nonetheless, whenever the 
virus should spring back and begin to spread through the country, the government of a 
domination-capable country has the capacity to contain and then diminish the epidemic. 
Ultimately, if it chooses to seal its borders and keeps Rt below 1, then a country will 
eventually eliminate the virus, as New Zealand recently has (“Coronavirus ‘currently 
eliminated’ in New Zealand,” 2020). Mortality ceases to be in essence a consequence of a 
natural phenomenon and becomes dependant also on choices made in government. 
 
Since there are competing policy goals, most obviously for “healthiness” and restoring social 
and economic “normality”, the key question at the policy level is how the competing 
demands are to be reconciled. The basis for such decisions we can call a paradigm. In the 
second part of the idea of suppression, Ferguson et al set out one paradigm: after reducing 
case numbers to low levels, the government commits to “maintaining that situation 
indefinitely”.  
 
Although a much overused word, paradigm is the right one precisely because it is so 
slippery. The paradigm might be explicitly articulated by a government, denied or buried. It 
might be steady, changeable or even whimsical. It might be disputed, including by the very 
people who are supposed to be coordinating the government’s policies. It might lurk in the 
subconscious and only be discernible to historians many years later. Despite all this, since 
choices between policies are made all the time, we can say that a paradigm of some kind 
certainly exists. In political unions with several component parts – as in the states of the 
United States, the members of the European Union or the nations of the United Kingdom – 
there may be a variety of bodies at both the supreme and component levels that adopt 
distinct paradigms.  
 
Thanks to its powerful political and economic implications this paradigm cannot be 
conceived as one of public health. But its consequences for mortality, and the way it affects 
the distribution of the risk of mortality across different subpopulations, means it also is not 
contained within the concept of political economy. We have entered a novel period in which 
the central question of government, the choice of paradigm, is intrinsically three-pronged – 
one of politics, economics and health. The corresponding scholarly discipline does not exist, 
there are no journals. 
 
What are the possible paradigms? In particular, to get a grip on all that slipperiness, can we 
establish a quantitative formalisation of the current situation that allows us to enumerate 
the possible paradigms that are in some sense cogent? The basic need is to be able to 
identify some policies as better than others, which implies we should draw on concepts of 
measurement. 
 
Let us restrict our attention to the simplest case with two goals. One goal is the reduction in 
infection and mortality from the epidemic, which we can contemplate measuring along a 
scale of unhealthiness. Most simply this would count the number of deaths each day from 
the virus. The other goal is harder to pin down in a way that would make sense to a 
government. We can say “economic activity” and make that notion precise but it’s clearly 
not just economic activity that concerns us. It is also, for example, the ability of people to 
simply enjoy their daily lives. This points up the inadequacy of the two-goal scenario. 
 
Still, let us stick with unhealthiness vs economic activity for now as we cannot hope to 
resolve more complex scenarios if we cannot handle the simplest one. Then a kind of 
paradigm, loosely defined for now and expressed in words, intended to reflect a sentiment 
often expressed by politicians, is Economy First (EF). In order to restore economic activity 
quickly, the government relaxes non-pharmaceutical interventions to an extent constrained 
only by the level of infection that the healthcare system can reasonably handle. Rt, will vary, 
with interventions bringing it down whenever the epidemic appears to be getting out of 
control.  
 
Hong Kong suggests another paradigm. A feature of its response to the epidemic is that it 
has never allowed its individual outbreaks to run out of control. At the same time, it has not 
sought to eliminate either community transmission or imported cases, instead maintaining 
Rt at about 1. (Cowling et al., 2020) This can be described as a Health First approach (HR). 
 
The New Zealand paradigm we could describe as Crush and Watch. Under CW, first 
community transmission is eliminated and then measures that make it easy to spot and 
contain any new outbreaks are maintained. 
 
With HF and CW, rates of infection are so low that relief from the epidemic, the widely 
discussed “exit”, is expected to come from elsewhere, most obviously from a vaccine, at 
some uncertain point in the future. Like an interest-only mortgage, the day-to-day 
arrangements do not attempt to resolve the underlying problem. With EF the picture is 
murkier; if “reasonably” is interpreted loosely, there is scope for a government to aim to 
achieve herd immunity within this paradigm. 
 
All three of these paradigms operate by establishing a threshold of unhealthiness that will 
be tolerated. The threshold is expressed as a principle, compliance with which can be 
readily observed. Under EF the assessment of what is “reasonable” pressure on the 
healthcare system can vary widely and until this parameter is clarified it is not truly well-
defined. Similarly, the degree of community transmission to be tolerated under HF could 
vary. Still, paradigms can be ordered: EF is chosen only to allow a higher threshold than HF, 
which in turn is higher than CW; within EF and HF we can expect different specifications of 
what is acceptable to enable ordering.  
 
An alternative would be to choose a threshold of economic activity. However, given the lack 
of understanding of the interplay between the two goals and the character of the virus, a 
threshold of economic activity comes with no guarantee as to the level of unhealthiness 
implied in practice. Deaths could be unbounded. Countries that are dominating their 
epidemic have already demonstrated that they are not willing to accept unlimited mortality; 
they are therefore unready to adopt an economic threshold. Thus we see the reversal of 
previous priorities noted by a former governor of the Bank of England (Mark Carney, 2020). 
 
The same problem of unbounded deaths afflicts more sophisticated methods of reconciling 
competing goals, traditionally conceptualised in economics as a utility function. We can 
establish a ratio scale of both unhealthiness (e.g. number of deaths) and economic activity 
(e.g. employment) (Stevens, 1951). This gives us the basic prerequisites for the use of a 
utility function. However, any utility function that itself lacks a threshold of unhealthiness 
again offers the possibility of an unacceptable number of deaths. That is, an elegant 
(differentiable) utility function without thresholds may be adopted, but it will always be 
secondary, operating within bounds established by the paradigmatic threshold.  
 
Such a secondary utility function may be helpful but is not needed. Once the threshold is 
established, one obvious approach is simply to attempt to maximise economic activity 
subject to that constraint. Unless the epidemic becomes quiescent, due to seasonality 
perhaps, this approach will lead to the threshold becoming a target, at least until the point 
when all NPIs are abandoned. This substantiates the point made above that, as a 
determinant of mortality, the epidemic’s own dynamic arising out of the virus’s inherent 
nature may be matched by the paradigm adopted by a domination-committed government. 
 
The same arguments apply if one adds additional goals. Thus we can conclude that in any 
country that has the capacity to dominate, and has chosen to, the paradigm that governs 
the resolution of competing goals will be one of a threshold of unhealthiness. The choice of 
this threshold is therefore the single most important decision such a government can make 
in managing its domestic affairs today. 
 
This simple conceptual framework provides a clear basis not only for making decisions but 
also for understanding what decisions have been made. To take the UK as an example, we 
conclude that the most important decision the government has taken during the COVID-19 
crisis was the adoption of a strategy of domination, revealed when the Prime Minister 
announced lockdown measures on 20 March (Boris Johnson, 2020a). The second most 
important decision emerged in stages between 16 April and 28 April. On 16 April the Foreign 
Secretary announced five tests for lifting NPIs (Dominic Raab, 2020), the fifth being: “Any 
adjustments to the current measures will not risk a second peak of infections.” On 27 April, 
the Prime Minister talked of the NHS being “overwhelmed” (Boris Johnson, 2020b). On 28 
April, the fifth test was revised by the Deputy Chief Scientific Adviser in a slide with the 
addition of the clause “…that overwhelms the NHS” (McLean, 2020). This sequence of 
statements introduced the idea of a threshold of unhealthiness; initially this was defined 
vaguely enough that it might have fallen into the category of either EF or HF; by the end it 
was fairly clearly defined as the higher EF and, within that category, at the upper end. Since 
the NHS has not been overwhelmed in the first wave of the epidemic, the threshold 
selected by the government implies it is willing in future to tolerate demand on the NHS 
that is at least as high as at the peak of the first wave. 
 
Looking at the paradigm supplied by Ferguson et al, it is also expressed as a threshold of 
unhealthiness and there is again some vagueness. What is the “low” level of case numbers it 
has in mind? A public health scholar might say it will at least be some variety of HF; but a 
politician might use it to mean some variety of EF. However, even allowing for that 
vagueness, “low” cannot really be regarded as equal or higher than the peak of the first 
wave. Therefore, one can say that the UK government, having adopted its first, dominating 
phase, has rejected its second, “indefinitely low” phase, and is no longer following the 
strategy of suppression. 
 
If we consider that the threshold of unhealthiness is fixed but the epidemic itself is 
unpredictable, then another conclusion is that there can be no absolute commitment to any 
economic activity or policy that requires the absence of NPIs. All such commitments are 
contingent, both on the natural ebb and flow of the epidemic and on the government’s skill 
in managing it. Government has become like sailing. It is likely that plans at all levels will 
have to be made and discarded over and over until herd immunity is reached. 
 
The future course of the pandemic in any territory will depend heavily on its government – 
first on the capacity for domination, then on the political will to implement it, and then on 
the paradigm adopted, which for those that have chosen domination will take the form of a 
threshold of unhealthiness. Therefore it would be helpful to have a table of countries, and 
sub-national units with the autonomy to establish their own approach, listing their status on 
these points. 
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